

THE IMPACT OF HATE SPEECH USED BY THE MEDIA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TURKISH MEDIA AND HATE SPEECH AGAINST GULEN MOVEMENT

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Introduction

Good afternoon everyone. My name is Huseyin Demir. I am an exiled law professor who is currently a political refugee in Germany and I am honored to address you today under the roof of Lithuanian Parliament which is a powerful symbol of Lithuanian democracy.

I will be talking about hate speech used by the media and its impacts on targeted groups. While I am doing that I will specifically focus on Turkish media and hate speech against a particular social movement namely Gülen Movement as an outstanding example of hate speech campaign.

Definition of Hate Speech

Despite its frequent usage, there is no consensus on a definition of hate speech. Some Scholars stress the wounding and vilifying character of hate speech, stating that ‘any form of expression directed at objects of prejudice that perpetrators use to wound and vilify its recipient is hate speech.’¹

According to some others, members of targeted groups are delegitimized, demonized, or portrayed as inferior in hate speech.² It has also been drawn attentions to the irrational, disapproving, hypercritical, unjustified expressional characteristics of hate speech.³

Parekh states, “Hate speech expresses, advocates, encourages, promotes, or incites hatred of a group of individuals distinguished by a particular feature or set of features’ and ‘when hate speech is permitted to be transmitted, it encourages a social climate in which particular groups are defamed and their discriminatory treatment is accepted as normal.”⁴

In summary, “Hate speech is the rhetoric of hate crimes and perpetuates racism, heterosexism, and sexism”.⁵

¹Boeckman, R. J. & Turpin-Petrosino, C. (2002), ‘Understanding the Harm of Hate Crime,’ *Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 207-225.

² Vollhardt et al. (2006), ‘Deconstructing Hate Speech in the DRC: A Psychological Media Sensitization Campaign,’ *Journal of Hate Studies*, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 15-35.

³ Tsesis, A. (2002), *Destructive Messages: How Hate Speech Paves the Way for Harmful Social Movements*, New York University Press, New York.

⁴ Parekh, B. (2006), ‘Hate Speech: Is There a Case of Banning?’ *Public Policy Research*, vol. 12, no.4, pp. 213-223.

⁵ Cowan, G. & Khatchadourian, D. (2003), ‘Empathy, Ways of Knowing, and Interdependence as Mediators of Gender Differences, Attitudes Toward Hate Speech and Freedom of Speech,’ *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, vol.27, no. 4, pp. 300-308.

The Consequences of Hate Speech

Hate speech has consequences because “[s]peech always matters, is always doing work; because everything we say impinges on the world in ways indistinguishable from the effects of physical action, we must take responsibility for our verbal performances – all of them”⁶.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) defines a hate crime as:

[...] any criminal offense, including offences against persons or property, where the victim’s premises or target of the offence are selected because of their real or perceived connection, attachment, affiliation, support or membership with a group. A group may be based upon their real or perceived race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual disorientation or other similar factors.⁷

The connection between hate speech and hate crime can be detected within a rhetorical stratagem of hate speech that is described by Whillock as having the following four characteristics:

- ‘ (1) to inflame the emotions of followers,
- (2) to denigrate the designated out-class,
- (3) to inflict permanent and irreparable harm to the opposition and ultimately
- (4) conquer’.⁸

In this way, hate crime can be seen to follow hate speech. Rwanda and Yugoslavia serve as the most dramatic and well-known examples of hate speech communicated through the media. Davison suggests that the ability to successfully convey the politics of hate relates to a number of factors, including the media’s role in instigating mass mobilizations. Nazi and fascist parties, for instance, took advantage of press laws, urbanization and mass communication to agitate and attract followers. Likewise, Milošević in Serbia and the Hutu extremists in Rwanda established ‘ultranationalist networks and controlled important media outlets’.⁹ Serbian media broadcast propaganda messages just as Hutu Radio des Mille Collines propagated hate stratagems, as described by Whillock¹⁰.

⁶ Hernández, T.K. (2011), ‘Hate Speech and the Language of Racism in Latin America: A Lens for Reconsidering Global Hate Speech Restrictions and Legislation Models,’ *University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law*, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 841.

⁷ www.osce.org

⁸ Whillock, R.K. (1995), ‘The Use of Hate as Stratagem for Achieving Political and Social Goals,’ in *Hate Speech*, eds R.K. Whillock & D. Slayden, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, p.32

⁹ Davison, J. (2006), ‘The Politics of Hate: Ultranationalist and Fundamentalist Tactics and Goals,’ *Journal of Hate Studies*, vol. 5, no. 1, p.50.

¹⁰ Whillock, R.K. (1995), ‘The Use of Hate as Stratagem for Achieving Political and Social Goals,’ in *Hate Speech*, eds R.K. Whillock & D. Slayden, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, p.32.

Hate Speech and the Media

Discourse ‘is the main interface between the social and cognitive dimensions of racism’.¹¹ This is important because ‘one of the main roles of discourse is the reproduction of social representations, such as knowledge, attitudes, ideologies, norms, and values’. Discourse can thus be said to play a fundamental role in provoking conflict as much as in establishing social peace. Furthermore, the way in which social problems are defined by news media strongly influences how the public and policy-makers understand and act on an issue¹². According to van Dijk, ‘the mass media are currently the most influential source of racist bias, prejudice, and racism [...] news, editorials, and opinion articles in the press are crucially involved in the formation of ethnic attitudes and ideologies’.¹³ Thus, the media is often the primary vehicle by which the public learns, in essence, about who is valued and who is not.

The Construction of Polarised Identities

‘Since every search for identity includes differentiating oneself from what one is not, identity politics is always and necessarily a politics of the creation of difference’¹⁴. Benhabib believes that ‘othering’ is an obligatory step in the process of identity construction. While the ‘self’ is constructed by emphasizing the qualities that differ from the ‘other,’ both identities are constructed. Therefore, polarisation and opposition are created by emphasizing the differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’. By creating a discriminative differentiation in the identity hierarchy, the desired and undesired identity is clarified. Positive self-representation and negative representation of the ‘other’ mark the ‘other’ as an out-group that is undesirable. By stressing the difference between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ members of the out-group are denigrated, demonized, delegitimized, or depicted as inferior. Through an examination of the referential, nomination, and prediction discursive strategies, negative names, adjectives, references and definitions are used in the construction of out-groups in media discourse.¹⁵

Hate Speech in Turkish Media

According to various research Reports¹⁶, the first four out-groups that are targeted and represented in a negative light in Turkish media are respectively the Gülen Movement, Christians (namely Armenians and Greeks), Jews (who are targeted as much as Christians) and Kurds.

¹¹ Van Dijk, T. A. (1992). Discourse and the denial of racism. *Discourse & society*, 3(1), 87-118 and see further Abdullah, Faiz. (2014). Mass media discourse: A critical analysis research agenda. 22. 1-16.

¹² Thompson, T. & Ungerleider, C.S. (2004), Single Sex Schooling: Final Report, Canadian Centre for Knowledge Mobilisation, Vancouver.

¹³ Van Dijk, T. A. (1995). Power and the news media. In D. Paletz (Ed.), *Political Communication and Action*. p.17 Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press

¹⁴ Benhabib, S. (1996), ‘The Democratic Moment and the Problem of Difference,’ *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, ed. S. Benhabib, Princeton University Press, New Jersey. p.3

¹⁵ Wodak, R. (2009), ‘Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, Theory and Methodology,’ in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, eds R. Wodak & M. Meyer, 2nd edn, Sage, London.

¹⁶ See, Stockholm Center for Freedom (SCF) (2017) *Erdoğan’s Vile Campaign of Hate Speech. Case Study: Targeting of The Gulen Movement*. https://stockholmcf.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Erdogans-Vile-Campaign-Of-Hate-Speech-Case-Study-Targeting-Of-The-Gulen-Movement_2017.pdf and TurkeyPurge (2016) Erdoğan calls on people

I will firstly analyze the approach in the Turkish Media towards ethnic minorities.

Ethnic minorities are described using a variety of words that have negative connotations and attributes. Furthermore, ethnic communities are frequently depicted as having undesirable characteristics. This situation is widely seen in news stories published by right-conservative-nationalist-Islamist newspapers. Some examples include:

“Despite being Ottoman citizens, Armenians, who dreamed ‘of forming Armenia on Turkish land,’ collaborated with enemy forces and stabbed Turkey in the back [...]”¹⁷

“The Greeks [...] no race in the world has such lying, untrustworthy, unreliable people”¹⁸

“The most ferocious enemy of Muslims are the Jews [...] Let me remind you that all gambling games were invented by Jews. Are you aware of how the Jews took you away from your [Muslim] faith and make you slaves?”¹⁹

Tsesis argues that violence against ethnic minorities and other outsider groups never occurs in isolation, but is legitimated and made more likely through a combination of social beliefs, customs, imagery, metaphors and stereotypes that degrade and dehumanise the ethnic minority. Indeed, “[e]motive response elicited by the repeated expression of disrespectful images about ethical, political, sexual, religious, or familial qualities of targeted groups”²⁰ produce all these social beliefs, customs, imagery, metaphors and stereotypes which are expanded and reinforced by the media. It is for this reason that we must focus on the relationship between hate speech and hate discourse in media, as well as its influence on hate crimes.

There is a growing, disturbing trend of hate discourse entering the political arena. A new tendency in Turkish politics, for instance, is to represent Kurds as non-Islamic. This is especially blatant in recent speeches and public addresses by R. Tayyip Erdoğan. The reality is that the vast majority of Turkey’s 15 million Kurds are Muslim. However, Kurdish members of the Turkish parliament, who sit with the opposition, are sometimes accused of being Zoroastrian or Yezidi. The President is reported as saying:

“They are Zoroastrian. [...] they are mentioning Yezidi. They are practising this kind [Yezidi] of worship. [However,] even if they are Yezidi, so long as they do not get involve with terror, we value human beings as human.”

By characterizing these opposition party members as Zoroastrian, Erdoğan aligns these Kurds, who are belong to a dissident political party, with non-Muslim religion and tradition, thereby engendering hostility towards them, given that non-Muslims are the historic enemy. He

to report Gülen followers to authorities. *Turkey Purge*, 29 August. <https://turkeypurge.com/erdogan-calls-on-people-to-report-gulen-followers-to-authorities>

¹⁷ Ruhat Mengi, Vatan 25 May 2011, haber.gazetevatan.com

¹⁸ H. Macit Yusuf, Yeniçağ 12 Sep. 2012, www.yg.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr;

¹⁹ Adnan Öksüz, Milli Gazete 3 Sep. 2012, www.milligazete.com.tr

²⁰ Tsesis, A. (2002), *Destructive Messages: How Hate Speech Paves the Way for Harmful Social Movements*, New York University Press, New York.p.81

therefore practises a ‘politics of difference’; a practice that ‘cannot easily be abstracted from particular histories of social conflict and ideological contestation’.

Stigmatizing, blaming, stereotyping and scapegoating are the main characteristics of hate speech and hate discourse, and most of the time serve to inflame the emotions of followers, thereby increasing support for speakers. Destructive ideologies and dehumanizing messages become ‘normal’ for followers and listeners exposed to hate speech on a regular basis through mass media²¹.

As it is argued by Vollhardt that ‘[s]tatements alleging the disloyalty of the ‘other’ can create mistrust against the stigmatised individual or group, and even incite irrational fear of the ostensibly subversive group within one’s society’²². As the quotations above show, non-Muslim (the Armenians, Jews and Rums) and Muslim minorities (such as the Kurds) or a social movement (such as Gulenists) alike are accused of disloyalty, treachery and of showing allegiance to other countries.

To understand the behavior of Turkish media, one must realize that media control is a crucial step on Erdogan’s path to becoming an authoritarian executive president with no checks and balances. His takeover of the Turkish media aims to silence rising opposition and criticism. Erdogan has limited freedom of speech and the media in Turkey by taking over 90 percent of the media, while the government regulates and blocks the internet and social media. By doing so, he not only undermines democracy, but also limits the voters’ ability to make free and informed decisions.

Hate Speech used against Gulen Movement by Erdogan and Turkish Media

Since the outbreak of a corruption scandal in late 2013 that implicated some cabinet ministers and family members of President Erdogan²³, a new chapter has been opened in Turkey’s history of hatred. Erdogan declared the investigations as an attempted coup against his government despite solid evidence on the schemes. The investigators and prosecutors conducting the probes were dismissed from their positions and some were arrested soon after the investigation. President Erdogan declared “all-out war” on the Gulen Movement, given its origins as a transnational religious civil society group inspired by Fethullah Gulen (a Muslim cleric now living in self-exile

²¹ Vollhardt et al. (2006), ‘Deconstructing Hate Speech in the DRC: A Psychological Media Sensitization Campaign,’ *Journal of Hate Studies*, vol. 5, no. 1, p.20

²² Ibid p.24

²³ Guiler, Kimberly. 2016. Towards Erdoğan and the East: Conspiracies and Public Perception in Post-Coup Turkey. In *Contemporary Turkish Politics*. December 7. The Project on Middle East Political Science pp.28–31.

in the US), blaming them for plotting the corruption probes²⁴. Since then, the president's political rhetoric has increasingly targeted members of the Movement²⁵.

“They are grave robbers! They are body snatchers. They are characterized by lies, deceit, subterfuge, dissension, conspiracy and slander. It is a treacherous terrorist organization. They have no morality! They have no decency! They have no love for the homeland, nation or flag! What an impostor he is! They are slanderous! They are so lowly, so treacherous...”

This is a compilation of quotes from the insults and hate speech uttered by President Erdoğan against the Gülen movement. The unprecedented process of vilifying and demonizing the Gülen movement was hurriedly kicked off by Erdoğan, who blatantly said, “Yes, it is a witch-hunt, and we are the ones who are conducting it.”

Unsurprisingly, such harsh expressions from Erdogan and other influential figures in the AKP found immediate support from the media. As a matter of fact, in some cases, the media was literally obliged to adopt this offensive language against the Gülen movement. Since December 17, 2013, news items slandering the Gülen movement have become a daily routine for part of the Turkish press. The media reported that the Gülen movement had a long list of immoral and illegal activities.

As a matter of fact, devotion and allegiance to the government and Erdoğan by a number of journalists reached such a level that some happily contended that they were not journalists, but Tayyibists (devoted supporters of Erdoğan). Many columnists also adopted an aggressive tone that closely resembled that of the government in the fight against the Gülen movement, and directed a variety of insults and accusations toward the movement. To begin with, for some the Gülen movement is just a puppet of international actors, although the answer to the question of who these international actors are varies from one journalist to another. Columnists claimed that a variety of entities - The Vatican, the United States, the European Union, Israel, Jewish lobbies, neo-cons, international Zionism, the Iraq-Damascus Islamic State, MOSSAD, MI5, the CIA, the FBI, the Moon Cult, the Freemasons, the Rockefeller family, and the Sephardi chief rabbis of Israel -- are either employers or partners of the Gülen movement. Members of the Gülen movement were declared to be pornsters, sneaky, putschists, tape editors, companions of Israel, rebelling against the Turkish state in the name of Israel, a foreign threat, a threat to national security, hashashins, worse than hashashins, perpetrators of the Dink murder, bandits, snakes, parasitic ivy, and the people who altered the rules of Islam. The Gülen movement was equated with an illegal criminal organization, a gang, a junta, and an intelligence organization. It was also argued that this movement was the sole perpetrator of all the illegal phone tapings that had recently taken place in Turkey, as they had infiltrated to the very depths of a GSM company. Interestingly, members of the Gülen movement who are actually university students were caught red-handed trying to “infiltrate” state-funded student dormitories using their student identities. But the most creative by far was the claim that there was a resemblance between the Gülen movement and the aliens from

²⁴ Ozeren, S., Cubukcu, S., & Bastug, M. F. (2021). Lessons Learned from ISIS Recruitment in Turkey: A Paradigm Shift in Counterterrorism Is Needed. *From Territorial Defeat to Global ISIS: Lessons Learned*, 151, 77.

²⁵ (Stockholm Center for Freedom [SCF] 2017), <https://stockholmcf.org/erdogans-vile-campaign-of-hate-speech-case-study-targeting-of-the-gulen-movement/>

the Matrix films, even though the entire trilogy was all about machines and computers with not a single reference to aliens.

Erdogan's severity took the form of outright demonization and vilification of the Movement in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in July 2016. Although he blamed the group for plotting the corruption probes and the coup attempt, Gulenists have explicitly denied their involvement in both efforts²⁶. In his address to the nation after the 2016 coup attempt, the president depicted informing on Gulen supporters as a "patriotic duty," encouraging citizens to become voluntary informants that spy on their coworkers, neighbors, relatives, and even family members.²⁷

During this period, the Gulen Movement has also been publicly targeted by ordinary people, prompting thousands of group members to leave Turkey due to ever-increasing demonization and seek asylum in Western countries²⁸. Those who could not leave have become targets of violent hate crimes. For example, inspired and motivated by the ongoing political hate rhetoric, a research assistant at Osmangazi University killed four of his colleagues in the faculty in 2018 for being alleged Gulen members²⁹. The murder suspect had previously lodged complaints about 102 academics with "FETO" (a derogatory term used by the AKP government while referring to the Gulen Movement) membership accusations (which led to their dismissal from academic positions) and in his first statement in police custody claimed to have felt no repentance for his act³⁰. This case has raised many questions about the devastating effect of political hate rhetoric and whether it fuels hate crimes among the Turkish populace.

As a result, thousands of people had to leave the country for their own safety, almost 150,000 were dismissed from the civil service without any effective judicial or administrative probe, and more than 650 000 people have been investigated with the accusation of being member of Gulen Movement which Erdogan Government defines as terrorist organization.

There were over 150,000 cases of detention in which hundreds of torture complaints were made by the UN and other credible nongovernmental organizations, and over hundred people died under suspicious circumstances.

The gross insults and hate speech frequently employed by Erdoğan do not target the Hizmet movement alone, of course. All individuals, social groups and even countries perceived by the president as being critical of him have had their share of insults. Yet, in terms of intensity,

²⁶ BBC (2014) Turkey's Fethullah Gulen denies corruption probe links. *BBC News*, 27 January.

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25909139> and Saul S (2016) An exiled cleric denies playing a leading role in coup attempt. *New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/17/us/fethullah-gulen-turkey-coup-attempt.html>

²⁷ TurkeyPurge (2016) Erdoğan calls on people to report Gulen followers to authorities. *Turkey Purge*, 29 August.

<https://turkeypurge.com/erdogan-calls-on-people-to-report-gulen-followers-to-authorities>.

²⁸ Advocates of Silenced Turkey Report (2017) Turkey: Events of 2016 <https://silencedturkey.org/turkey-events-of-2016>.

²⁹ Fox K and Alam HA (2018) Four killed in Turkey university shooting. *CNN*, 5 April.

<https://edition.cnn.com/2018/04/05/europe/turkey-university-shooting-intl/index.html>

³⁰ Perry, Barbara & Akca, Davut & Karakus, Fatih & Bastug, Mehmet. (2020). "Planting Hate Speech to Harvest Hatred: How Does Political Hate Speech Fuel Hate Crimes in Turkey?" *International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy*. Vol 9 (4) pp.195-211.

frequency and magnitude of rage, Erdoğan's insults against the Hizmet movement rank first by a long shot.

The research done by SCF found that Erdoğan has uttered 240 different derogatory phrases that amount to hate speech against the Gülen movement in a little over three years. Given the fact that each derogatory phrase and instance of hate speech has been voiced by Erdoğan dozens and even hundreds of times in various public speeches, the horrendous nature of Erdoğan's onslaught against the movement is worse than it appears at first glance. He entrenches the hateful narrative by repeatedly employing it in public speeches.³¹

Considering further that the media outlets directly or indirectly controlled by Erdoğan frequently and pervasively parroted the same rhetoric, the intensity of the insults and hate speech targeting the Gülen movement can be better understood. As an example of how Erdoğan's insults and hate speech have dominated the media scene in Turkey, a simple search for the derogatory phrase "FETÖ" -- an acronym for the Gülenist Terror Organization frequently used by Erdoğan and pro-Erdoğan media networks -- on Google produced more than 62 million results on May 18, 2017.

It would be unreasonable to conclude that such widely disseminated expressions by one of the most eminent figures in the history of Turkish politics would have no impact on society. Only after the Gülen movement became the target of such allegations and insults did some practical consequences occur. For example, teachers at schools established by the Gülen movement were beaten. In another case, a demonstration with a sprinkle of violence was held by the supporters/members of the ruling party in front of the premises of a television station close to the Gülen Movement.

The case of the Gulen Movement in Turkey has not yet turned into the genocide observed in Rwanda. However, the ongoing hate rhetoric used by President Erdogan and other top government officials, as well as a rise in the prevalence of hate crimes against the group, have reached a critical point in recent years.

I would like to summarize a study which is very important to understand hate speech against the movement in this context.

According to this study, the political rhetoric used against the Gulen Movement readied members of dominant groups in Turkey to commit or condone acts of violence. President Erdogan's and the Media's use of hate speech effectively divided the public into "us versus them" or "good versus evil," which evoked and exploited the fears of Gulenists. Erdogan and other politicians within the AKP who denounced the Movement have especially substantial influence over their followers, particularly because they have been in power since 2002. Their presence in Turkey has been so powerful that people have even turned against their own families and friends, including their own children, siblings, and other relatives, in solidarity with the president.

³¹ (Stockholm Center for Freedom [SCF] 2017), <https://stockholmcf.org/erdogans-vile-campaign-of-hate-speech-case-study-targeting-of-the-gulen-movement/>.

Another important finding addresses how President Erdogan and his media have used religious rhetoric to mobilize their supporters. As shown, many perpetrators approved and embraced Erdogan's hate speeches and even used them against Movement members for a number of reasons. First, Erdogan appealed religious sources to justify and strengthen his position. Second, he has been very effective in mobilizing the masses, which have supported him politically throughout his tenure as leader of the AKP and as Turkey's president. In an analysis of hate crimes, Barka concluded that religious fanaticism that causes individuals to develop extreme worldviews may motivate them to perpetrate hate crimes against out-groups³². Religiosity has become one of the "identity discourses" governments use to "do difference" and deem "others" as "deviant, dangerous and inferior"³³. In this sense, Erdogan supporters have recognized his hateful rhetoric was a call to action against the "others" (i.e., Gulenists), and have become willing to comply by committing willful acts of violence.³⁴

Also shown, hate crimes incited by politically charged hate speech have reached a dangerous level, such that the victims have been forced to leave their country or otherwise distance themselves from society. This is due to the fear of further victimization as well as losing a sense of belonging to country—both of which were the unbearable outcomes of strategic exclusion and demonization against members of the Gulen Movement. Further, the study examined the repercussions of hate speech and hate crimes against the Movement, and the effects on members' daily life practices and social interactions. Similar to previous research on hate crime victimization³⁵, the survey and interview findings indicated that the victims made significant changes in their lives due to the fear of further persecution and deliberately alienated themselves from society. These changes included moving to another neighborhood or city, fleeing to another country, changing daily routines, avoiding certain places at certain times and attending group activities, and adopting more personal security measures. This alienation and willingness to reconfigure daily life persisted even after migrating to a foreign country, with some respondents preferring not to contact other non-Movement members of the Turkish diaspora.

Conclusion

In this presentation I have demonstrated that explicit hate speech is common in Turkish media, regardless of ideological or political position, and that it disrupts social peace. Media uses discourse strategies that represent minorities and social groups particularly Gulen Movement as disloyal citizens and traitors, in particular constructed as the evil and historic enemy. Through this discourse, and with the help of the media, social polarization is justified and normalized. Conducting research on the issue can provide data that helps to change the status quo. Such research can also provide support to citizens who are targeted by hate speech. Moreover, showing

³² Barka MB (2006) Religion, religious fanaticism and hate crimes in the United States. *Revue Française d'études Américaines* 110(4): 107–121. <https://doi.org/10.3917/rfea.110.0107>

³³ Perry B (2001) *In the Name of Hate*. New York: Routledge, p.180.

³⁴ Benesch, S., Buerger, C., Glavinic, T., & Manion, S. (2020). *Dangerous speech: A practical guide*. Dangerous Speech Project. <https://dangerouspeech.org/guide/>

³⁵ see James G. Bell & Barbara Perry (2015) Outside Looking In: The Community Impacts of Anti-Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Hate Crime, *Journal of Homosexuality*, 62:1, 98-120.

the destructive effects of hate speech on social peace can help raise awareness of the issue and gain the support required to confront and fight against it on a societal level.

In conclusion, the mass media's propagation of hate speech is not only an ethical problem but also a violation of human rights. In order to reduce hate speech in the media, we must educate journalists and reinforce ethical codes. Thus, subjects like hate speech, human rights-based journalism and peace journalism should be a core part of university journalism curricula. When hate speech becomes the dominant discourse and ideology of governments, states and societies, it diminishes the capacity for peace. When racism, nationalism and sexism become deeply embedded in the fabric of society, it becomes imperative that the state acts to uproot the hate politics and hate paradigms that threaten social peace and stability.

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